Originally published in 1966. This is a self-instructional course intended for first-year university students who have not had previous acquaintance with Logic. The book deals with "propositional" logic by the truth-table method, briefly introducing axiomatic procedures, and proceeds to the theory of the syllogism, the logic of one-place predicates, and elementary parts of the logic of many-place predicates. Revision material is provided covering the main parts of the course. The course represents from eight to twenty hours work. depending on the (...) student's speed of work and on whether optional chapters are taken. (shrink)

It is unfortunate that Hamblin’s contributions do not get him the credit he deserves for his remarkable achievements. Although his contributions to philosophy are well enough recognized, and his early contributions to computing have been acknowledged, it seems strange that his work has not been widely enough recognized for the interdisciplinary effect it has had. There has been a feedback loop whereby his theories on formal dialogue systems and imperatives were taken up in argumentation, applied in computing, and then (...) used in this form to refine argumentation methods. (shrink)

I finished my undergraduate degree at Monash University and joined Charles Hamblin’s seminar at the University of NSW in March, 1968. Phil Staines from the University of Newcastle joined at the same time, and Vic Dudman was an established member. Hamblin’s book Fallacies would be published in 1970, but the seminar discussions rarely concerned fallacies. This may have been because Hamblin had been working for so long and so closely with those ideas that he was now (...) ready to turn elsewhere. But I shall argue that the book was only part of a much broader program, other parts of which occupied us in the seminars. Hamblin never explicitly discussed the writing of Fallacies with me, and what follows is an attempt to explain how the book fitted into his overall project as a logician, drawn from his published works and from what I remember of his contributions to the seminar. (shrink)

EM Music Education /EM is a collection of thematically organized essays that present an historical background of the picture of education first in Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, then Early-Modern Europe. The bulk of the book focuses on American education up to the present. This third edition includes readings by Orff, Kodály, Sinichi Suzuki, William Channing Woodbridge, Allan Britton, and Charles Leonhard. In addition, essays include timely topics on feminism, diversity, cognitive psych, testing (the Praxis exam) and (...) the No Child Left Behind Act. (shrink)

TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- I. La rinascita novecentesca 1. Chaïm Perelman: la nuova retorica 2. Stephen Toulmin: la pratica logica e l’uso degli argomenti 3. Ragionamento e linguaggio: la logica naturale di Jean-Blaise Grize -/- II. La logica informale 1. Informale vs. formale? 2. Il concetto di argomento 3. La ripresa della teoria di Paul Grice 4. La ricostruzione degli argomenti 5. La valutazione degli argomenti: le fallacie 6. Il network problem -/- III. Dialogo e dialettica 1. La logica dialogica (...) di Paul Lorenzen 2. Charles L. Hamblin e i sistemi dialettici 3. Else Barth e la dialettica formale 4. Jaakko Hintikka: logica interrogativa e teoria dei giochi -/- IV. Pragmatica e dialettica 1. La Pragma-Dialectics di van Eemeren e Grootendorst: un ideale filosofico della razionalità 2. Ricostruzione e valutazione degli argomenti 3. L’analisi delle fallacie 4. Fallacie e biases: tra argomentazione e psicologia -/- V. Intersoggettività e impegni dialogici 1. La New Dialectic e il ragionamento interpersonale: Douglas Walton ed Erik Krabbe 2. Contesti dialogici e commitment store 3. Teoria delle fallacie e presumptive reasoning 4. La fondazione della Informal Logic 5. Argomentazione, informatica e scienza cognitiva -/- VI. Razionalità e fondazione 1. Razionalità discorsiva: la pragmatica universale di Jürgen Habermas 2. Razionalità inferenziale e semantica: la pragmatica normativa di Robert B. Brandom 3. La pragmatica trascendentale di Karl O. Apel 4. Modelli di razionalità 5. Fondazione o giustificazione -/- VII. Argomentazione e pratiche sociali 1. Ragionamento pratico 2. Etiche del discorso 3. Diritto e politiche dell’argomentazione. (shrink)

Since the 1950s, the philosophy shared among many in the field of music education is that music education should "develop the aesthetic potential, with which every human being is endowed, to the highest possible level."1 This philosophy, presented by Charles Leonhard and Robert House in Foundations and Principles of Music Education, highlights theirs and others' philosophy of music education and the arts as a whole. Most notably, John Dewey's Art as Experience, Susan Langer's Philosophy in a New Key, (...) and William C. Hartshorn's "Integrity in Music Education" all played a key role in shaping the past and present theories of music education. Hartshorn, who seems to be the most deliberate in his... (shrink)

Formal dialectic has its roots in ancient dialectic. We can trace this influence in Charles Hamblin’s book on fallacies, in which he introduced his first formal dialectical systems. Earlier, Paul Lorenzen proposed systems of dialogical logic, which were in fact formal dialectical systems avant la lettre, with roles similar to those of the Greek Questioner and Answerer. In order to make a comparison between ancient dialectic and contemporary formal dialectic, I shall formalize part of the Aristotelian procedure for (...) Academic debates. The resulting system will be compared (1) with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s system of rules of Critical Discussion (the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure), which must, however, first itself be reconstructed as a formal dialectical system, and (2) with a Hamblin-type system, and (3) a Lorenzen-type system. When drawing comparisons, it will become clear that there is a line to be drawn from Aristotle to formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics, extending to contemporary computational models of argument. (shrink)

At 8 a.m. I get in my car and set off for work. At 7:59 a.m., before I started it, my car was at rest; at 8:01 a.m. it is in motion. When a thing is not in motion, it is at rest, and when it is not at rest, it is in motion. But what was the state of the car at 8:00 a.m., as I was starting it? It would be inaccurate to say that it was in motion (...) but it would be inaccurate, also, to say that it was at rest: it was “just starting.” But, if whenever a thing is not in motion it is at rest, the state of “just starting”—or, of course, the comparable state of “just stopping”—must be either a state of motion or a state of rest. Which? (shrink)

The National Academy of Science's 1956 study on the Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation was designed to provide an objective analysis to assess conflicting statements by leading geneticists and by officials in the Atomic Energy Commission. Largely because of its status as a detached, non-governmental evaluation by eminent scientists, no studies have had a broader impact on the development of biological thinking in regard to nuclear policies. This paper demonstrates that despite the first BEAR study's reputation as an objective and (...) independent study, it was the product of careful negotiation between Academy scientists, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Britain's Medical Research Council. This paper also reveals the fragility of the consensus that produced the Academy's report, the range of political uses of the report, and the subsequent disaffection of the scientists who took part in it. (shrink)

The paper describes four dialogue systems, developed in the tradition of Charles Hamblin. The first system provides an answer for Achilles in Lewis Carroll's parable, the second an analysis of the fallacy of begging the question, the third a non-psychologistic account of conversational implicature, and the fourth an analysis of equivocation and of objections to it. Each avoids combinatorial explosions, and is intended for real-time operation.

Although it often chafed at scientists' wishes to promote international cooperation, the U.S. Navy was a great supporter of such initiatives during the 1950s. This essay examines the impetus for the Navy's alliance with scientists to bolster its antisubmarine capabilities, the reasons for its acceptance of international cooperation as a means to ensure its technological capabilities during a general war, and the source of its clashes with scientists over the issue of classification. Using diverse sources, including the records of the (...) Navy's Strategic Plans Division, the essay illustrates that, despite the confluence of interests between the Navy and oceanographers, there was a decisive difference in their views as to the ultimate utility of basic research. This difference stemmed largely from scientists' limited perception of science as the capital for new technology and the Navy's perception of science as the collection of operational data for existing technology. This essay, which takes the Navy's views more fully into account, brings to light an issue that should be an important component of any analysis of scientists working with the military. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

RésuméTout au long de sa vie, Immanuel Kant a soutenu que les personnes non humaines existent probablement, mais il a omis de préciser comment nous pourrions les reconnaître. Dans cet article, je vais démontrer (a) que les organismes non humains peuvent être considérés comme des personnes non humaines s'ils peuvent être envisagés comme appartenant à une espèce à vocation morale, et (b) qu'une espèce peut être considérée comme ayant une vocation morale si au moins un de ses membres est capable (...) de faire ce que j'appellerai un « sacrifice moral » dans lequel il sacrifie sa vie physique pour le bien de sa vie morale. (shrink)